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AVOIDING MARKET DEFINITION UNDER 
SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 
Johnny Shaw* 
 
The 2018 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Ohio v. American Express Co. 
was at odds with a trend among antitrust commentators and enforcement 
authorities away from dependence on formal market definition as part of 
plaintiffs’ burden of proof.  Reliance on market definition as a dispositive 
issue has been ubiquitous in antitrust cases, but the costs from errors, 
inefficiency, and uncertainty inherent in that approach are glaring.  The 
issue is ripe for clarification, and this Note suggests a new rule to that end.  
The proposed rule aims to delineate a set of cases in which formal market 
definition can confidently be dispensed with, in the hopes of reducing 
uncertainty in antitrust cases and streamlining their administration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The most heavily litigated issue in modern antitrust cases is market 
definition:  the question of what boundaries to set for the slice of economic 
activity considered in evaluating whether a given agreement, merger, or other 
action is anticompetitive.1  Courts often require antitrust plaintiffs to prove 
that defendants possess a certain level of market power2—best described as 
the ability to profitably raise prices well above marginal costs3—to meet their 
burden of proof.  If a firm raises the price of its product above the competitive 
level, but in so doing sacrifices sales to the point that the price hike is not 
profitable, that firm lacks market power.4  If it can maintain a 
supracompetitive price without sacrificing demand and maintain or increase 
profits, it possesses market power.5  Of course, market power is not a binary 
issue, it is a sliding scale from zero to monopoly.6  What antitrust 
practitioners and commentators mean when they ask whether a firm 
possesses market power is whether it possesses the requisite level of market 
power to cause anticompetitive effects in the relevant market.7 
The standard approach for district courts confronted with an antitrust case 
is to (1) define the relevant market by including or excluding possible 
substitutes for the product; (2) determine defendants’ market share; (3) use 
that information to infer whether defendants possess market power; and only 
then (4) decide whether defendants have used that power to cause 
anticompetitive effects in the relevant market—namely, an increase in price, 
decrease in output, or decrease in quality of the product.8  The upshot of using 
this particular approach is that market definition is often dispositive.9  The 
issue is so amorphous, however, courts can usually construe it in a way that 
leaves defendants with a market share below the threshold and thus avoid 
analyzing the nature of the agreement itself, or its likely effects.10  The lack 
 
 1. Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 439 (2010). 
 2. See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden, The History of Antitrust Market Delineation, 76 MARQ. 
L. REV. 123, 137 (1992). 
 3. See, e.g., 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW:  AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 501 (4th ed. 2013). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See, e.g., Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization:  The 
Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 762 (2012); Richard A. Posner & 
William M. Landes, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 938 (1980). 
 9. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 469 n.15 
(1992) (“Because market power is often inferred from market share, market definition 
generally determines the result of the case.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, On the Relevance of Market Power, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 
1404 (2017); Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Sailing a Sea of Doubt:  A Critique of the Rule of Reason 
in U.S. Antitrust Law, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 591, 638–39 (2012); Robert Pitofsky, 
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of clear rules leaves those who favor more lenient antitrust enforcement an 
opening to argue that defendants lack market power in almost any case.11 
The 2018 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Ohio v. American Express Co.12 
(“Amex”) is an apt example of this dynamic.  The Court affirmed the Second 
Circuit’s reversal of a district court ruling that antisteering agreements 
between American Express and the merchants that accepted its cards were 
anticompetitive.13  The agreements prohibited merchants from steering 
consumers away from using their American Express cards by offering 
incentives or merely requesting they use a different card.14  Merchants were 
inclined to do this because the swipe fees—percentages taken from each 
transaction by the credit card company—that American Express charges are 
significantly higher than those of the other major cards.15  The district court 
found that these agreements prevented other card companies from competing 
by offering lower fees to merchants.16  The merchants’ inability to steer 
customers towards other cards inhibited price competition for merchants 
among card issuers, which inflated prices across the board, or so found the 
district court.17 
The Second Circuit reversed on the grounds that plaintiffs had not 
addressed the two-sided nature of the relevant market or the effects of 
antisteering agreements on the cardholder side of that market,18 and the 
Supreme Court affirmed.19  The Court found that card issuers competed for 
merchants to accept their cards and for consumers to use them, and that one 
form of competition cannot be considered independent from the other.20  
Furthermore, it found that the product at issue was not the card itself but 
rather the transaction because both a consumer and a merchant are required 
for either to use the card.21  Because the two sides of the market may affect 
one another, merely showing that the agreements caused anticompetitive 
effects on the merchant side was not enough—plaintiffs needed to show that 
the overall effect on both sides of the market was anticompetitive, and they 
failed to do so.22  According to the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court, 
the district court erred in defining the relevant market. 
 
Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 825 (1987) (“[M]easurement of market 
power, which requires the definition of relevant product and geographic markets, is the most 
elusive and unreliable aspect of antitrust enforcement.”). 
 11. See Pitofsky, supra note 10, at 22–23 (describing the market power requirement as a 
central component of a “minimalist” antitrust policy). 
 12. 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
 13. Id. at 2283. 
 14. See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 149–50 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), 
rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 15. Id. at 205. 
 16. Id. at 213–15. 
 17. Id. at 212. 
 18. United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 206–07 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub 
nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
 19. Ohio v. Am. Express Co. (Amex), 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2283 (2018). 
 20. Id. at 2287. 
 21. Id. at 2286. 
 22. Id. at 2287. 
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The Amex opinion was at odds with a trend among antitrust scholars and 
enforcement authorities, who are increasingly wary of courts’ intense focus 
on market definition.23  In particular, they are critical of the use of market 
definition as an early screen to dismiss cases before considering other aspects 
of the behavior at issue.24  There is much ambiguity and confusion among 
practitioners regarding what plaintiffs must show to pass through that 
screen.25  One author has gone so far as to argue that, due in part to confusion 
over market definition, current antitrust doctrine may violate the rule of law 
because market participants cannot foresee with sufficient certainty what 
courts and enforcement authorities will view as an antitrust violation.26  This 
Note shares that skepticism of market definition and argues that courts’ 
emphasis on the issue is largely undue.  The process of evaluating market 
power by defining the market and calculating defendants’ market share is 
fraught with error costs, especially when used as a threshold inquiry, and is 
often not the most efficient way to uncover anticompetitive behavior.27  The 
usefulness of this approach is at its nadir in cases under section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, which prohibits collusion among market participants to 
restrain trade.28  This type of behavior is inherently more dangerous than 
actions by a single firm, which are covered by section 2 of the Sherman Act.29  
Where two or more actors who formerly pursued their interests separately 
decide to work together, at least one form of competition is necessarily 
lessened.30  Additionally, the Supreme Court has held explicitly that formal 
market definition is not a requirement under section 1.31  But the Court has 
not provided any clear guidelines for when market definition may be 
avoided.32  In the absence of such guidance, lower courts continue to proceed 
with the standard, error-prone approach.33 
This Note argues that under section 1 of the Sherman Act, plaintiffs should 
be able to make a prima facie showing of anticompetitive effects without 
 
 23. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES 7–8 (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/ 
100819hmg.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4H8-JXBP] [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES] (describing market definition as one tool among many at the disposal of antitrust 
enforcers, rather than a necessary first step, as past versions of the guidelines had framed it); 
see also Daniel A. Crane, Market Power Without Market Definition, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
31, 32 (2014); David S. Evans, Lightening Up on Market Definition, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW 53, 55–58 (Einer Elhuage ed., 2012); Kaplow, supra 
note 1, at 502–06. 
 24. See Evans, supra note 23, at 72–73; Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason 
Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1425–26 (2009); see also HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 23, at 7. 
 25. Stucke, supra note 24, at 1425–26. 
 26. Id. at 1425–26, 1465. 
 27. See infra Part II.B. 
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 29. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768–69 (1984) 
(“Concerted activity inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk.”). 
 30. Id. at 769. 
 31. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists (IFD), 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986). 
 32. See Gavil, supra note 8, at 754–59. 
 33. See Crane, supra note 23, at 32; Evans, supra note 23, at 55–56. 
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defining the relevant market when there is evidence that an agreement 
prevents a class of economic actors from engaging in some competitive 
strategy they otherwise would have pursued.  This finding may be rebutted if 
defendants can demonstrate other procompetitive effects of the agreement, 
but market definition should not be used to dispose of cases at the outset 
where these conditions are present.  This argument finds ample support in the 
history of the Sherman Act itself,34 in Supreme Court precedent,35 and in the 
academic literature.36  Following this rule would significantly reduce error 
costs in antitrust cases, increase their efficiency, and provide businesses with 
more certainty to make strategic decisions.37 
Part I begins with a brief examination of the stated goals of the Sherman 
Act’s drafters. It then turns to the rule of reason, the burden-shifting test 
courts use in most cases under section 1, and the role of market power in that 
analysis.  Part II examines how market definition fits into that process, why 
it has become so central to many antitrust cases, and whether its role is 
proper.  Part III introduces the proposed rule as a tool to contain market 
definition, discussing how it would apply and its likely implications.  It 
concludes with a close look at how the proposed rule might operate in 
pharmaceutical pay-for-delay lawsuits, a convenient set of test cases. 
I.  MARKET POWER UNDER THE RULE OF REASON 
The specter of market power hangs over all antitrust jurisprudence, but the 
nuances of its relationship to competition are little understood and its effects 
are often vastly oversimplified.38  Furthermore, there is evidence that the 
commonly used measurements of market power often do not reflect the 
significance or direction of its effect on competition.39  Where key 
assumptions in an issue as decisive as market power rest on an uncertain 
foundation, a brief wide-angle look at the issue in the context of the broad 
purposes of antitrust law is worthwhile. 
As an initial matter, pinning down the goals of antitrust law is difficult due 
to its nature as an evolving, amorphous, judge-crafted body.  The laws 
themselves are some of the vaguest on the books.40  The Sherman Act simply 
outlaws “restraint[s] of trade”41 but fails to include a definition for that term, 
handing the task off to the courts.42  To a great extent, then, antitrust law is a 
product of the Supreme Court, and its opinions contain the most important 
 
 34. See infra Part I.A. 
 35. See infra Part III.A. 
 36. See infra Part II.B. 
 37. See infra Part III.B. 
 38. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 10, at 1305. 
 39. See Crane, supra note 23, at 37–39. 
 40. See, e.g., Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2543, 2547 (2013). 
 41. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 42. Id.; see also The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/2X54-
H8KM] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
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evidence in divining the purpose of the doctrine.43  The following analysis 
starts by considering statements made by the drafters of the Sherman Act, 
and discusses briefly the foundational goals of antitrust law.  It then turns to 
the Supreme Court opinions that have shaped the modern understanding of 
the antitrust laws and the rule of reason test and seeks to identify common 
threads regarding overarching purpose.  Finally, it assesses the role of 
market-power measurements under the rule of reason and whether it should 
be considered as a separate element of the plaintiff’s burden. 
A.  The Foundational Goals of Antitrust Law 
Modern courts tend to operate under the assumption that the goal of 
antitrust law is consumer welfare, i.e., maximum economic efficiency to 
achieve low prices for consumers and low costs for producers.44  The term 
“consumer welfare,” as it is used in antitrust, was introduced by then 
professor Robert Bork in a 1966 law review article.45  Bork presented a 
review of the legislative history of the Sherman Act, concluding that 
“Congress’ position with respect to efficiency cannot be explained on any 
hypothesis other than that consumer welfare was in all cases the controlling 
value.”46  It did not take much investigation from other scholars to determine, 
however, that this conclusion resulted from, at best, a selective reading of 
that history.47  Bork’s analysis focused on the comments of Senator John 
Sherman, the law’s namesake, but the record clearly indicates that the final 
bill was drafted and shepherded through Congress by others.48  In fact, 
Senator Sherman only reluctantly voted for the finished product, believing it 
would be “totally ineffective.”49 
The principal authors of the law were Senators George Edmunds and 
George Hoar, members of the Judiciary Committee that redrafted the bill 
before it passed.50  There is strong evidence that they, along with other key 
players, were equally concerned with injury to competitors as they were with 
injury to consumers, if not more so, and favored lawsuits brought by 
 
 43. See, e.g., 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, ¶ 103d; First & Waller, supra note 
40, at 2547. 
 44. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE:  PRINCIPLE AND 
EXECUTION 31 (2008); Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253, 
2254 (2013). 
 45. Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 
7, 7 (1966).  Bork defined consumer welfare as “maximization of wealth or consumer want 
satisfaction,” arguing courts should permit agreements that “increase wealth through 
efficiency” and condemn those that “decrease it through restriction of output.” Id. 
 46. Id. at 26. 
 47. Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & 
ECON. 133, 142 n.35 (2011); see also 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, ¶ 103; 
Christopher Grandy, Original Intent and the Sherman Antitrust Act:  A Re-examination of the 
Consumer-Welfare Hypothesis, 53 J. ECON. HIST. 359, 373 (1993); Orbach, supra note 44, at 
2256. 
 48. Orbach, supra note 44, at 2259–60. 
 49. Id. at 2260. 
 50. Id. 
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competitors over those brought by consumers.51  Senator Hoar offered 
specific language for the bill, clarifying that if “one of the purposes [of an 
agreement is] to compel any person, partnership, or corporation to become a 
party thereto, or to cease from doing any lawful business, or to sell and 
dispose of any lawful business,” the injured party may sue.52  This view of 
antitrust as protecting the freedom of economic actors to pursue any 
competitive strategy, apart from the implications on consumers, is decidedly 
not in line with Bork’s hypothesis or with the views of modern courts.53 
Another theme evident in the Sherman Act’s legislative history is the 
importance of antitrust law in preserving democracy, resulting from the 
inseparability of economic and political power.54  This was not a novel idea 
at the time; in fact, it reaches back to first years of the republic.  In The 
Federalist, James Madison railed against the dangers of factions—groups of 
citizens united around some common interest—who may seek political 
power to advance their interests, even where they are adverse to those of the 
citizenry as a whole.55  He identified the most dangerous factions as those 
formed around economic interests, which have a particular propensity to 
influence government,56 and recognized the regulation and maintenance of 
peace among those interests as “the principle task of modern legislation.”57 
Statements by the other principal author of the Sherman Act, Senator 
Edmunds, indicate that he shared this conception of antitrust law.58  He 
argued on the Senate floor that companies must not be able to accumulate 
power to the point where they become “tyrannies, grinding tyrannies, that 
have sometimes in other countries produced riots, just riots in the moral 
sense.”59  Such language, and the invocation of “just riots,” reveals a belief 
that economic suppression resulting from concentration of power could 
provide a legitimate reason for political revolution.  It suggests that Congress 
meant to not only ensure economic efficiency but to protect political liberty 
from threats posed by concentrations of economic power. 
Some modern antitrust scholars have likewise recognized that where 
concentration of power constrains liberty in the economic sphere, the true 
expression of political liberty often suffers in turn.60  Professor Robert 
Pitofsky argued in a widely cited 1979 law review article that Congress’s 
1950 amendments to section 7 of the Clayton Act “exhibited a clear concern 
that an economic order dominated by a few corporate giants . . . [could] 
facilitate the overthrow of democratic institutions and the installation of a 
 
 51. See, e.g., 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, ¶ 103b. 
 52. See 21 CONG. REC. 2599 (1890) (statement of Sen. Hoar). 
 53. 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, ¶ 103d. 
 54. See Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1053 
(1979); Zephyr Teachout & Lina Khan, Market Structure and Political Law:  A Taxonomy of 
Power, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 61–62 (2014). 
 55. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See 21 CONG. REC. 2726 (1890) (statement of Sen. Edmunds). 
 59. Id. 
 60. E.g., Pitofsky, supra note 54, at 1053; Teachout & Khan, supra note 54, at 61–62. 
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totalitarian regime.”61  Many Supreme Court decisions in the subsequent two 
decades reflected a similar concern.62 
While many academics have questioned the consumer-welfare standard, 
others vigorously defend it.63  Courts continue largely to adhere to it,64 likely 
because of the limits on uncertainty it offers.65  In an otherwise nebulous 
doctrine, the consumer-welfare standard at least provides a lighthouse in the 
fog.66  This Note does not address the merits of the consumer-welfare 
standard directly.  Rather, it points to these lesser known themes from the 
Sherman Act’s legislative history as a potential source of direction in crafting 
new rules.  The legislative history lends a certain theoretical coherency to the 
arguments made here in favor of refocusing antitrust scrutiny from statistics 
to behavior. 
In sum, evidence suggests that the focus of Congress in enacting the 
Sherman Act and subsequent antitrust legislation was on protecting free 
competition among economic actors for its own sake as much as, and separate 
from, ensuring economic efficiency; and it perceived the law as a bulwark 
against political tyranny resulting from concentration of economic power. 
B.  The Rule of Reason 
The rule of reason is the test courts most often use to determine whether a 
given defendant’s conduct amounts to an anticompetitive restraint of trade.67  
Historically, two paths were available for plaintiffs to prove an antitrust 
violation—the rule of reason and the doctrine of per se illegality—but 
recently the boundaries have blurred and the per se doctrine is mostly limited 
to price-fixing and bid-rigging.68  Developed and continually redeveloped by 
the courts since the enactment of the broadly worded Sherman Act in 1890, 
the rule of reason remains amorphous,69 but lower courts have largely 
coalesced around a three-step, burden-shifting framework, which the 
Supreme Court has endorsed.70  First, plaintiffs must prove that the restraint 
 
 61. Pitofsky, supra note 54, at 1053–54. 
 62. Id. at 1070 (first citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); then 
citing United States v. Von’s Grocery, 384 U.S. 270 (1966); and then citing United States v. 
Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966)). 
 63. See, e.g., Steven C. Salop, Question:  What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare 
Standard?:  Answer:  The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 
348–53 (2010); Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust:  Welfare 
Trumps Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2405, 2406 (2013).  
 64. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 65. See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg, Bork’s Legislative Intent and the Courts, 79 
ANTITRUST L.J. 941, 949–51 (2014). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Markham, supra note 10, at 593. 
 68. See Gavil, supra note 8, at 759. 
 69. See Markham, supra note 10, at 596. 
 70. See Amex, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (citing Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk 
Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993)); see also Gavil, supra note 8, at 760–
66; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 103–04 (2018). 
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has or may impede competition.71  If the plaintiffs satisfy step one, the burden 
then shifts to the defendants for step two.72  Defendants must then 
demonstrate that the restraint has a procompetitive justification.73  If the 
defendants are successful under step two, the burden shifts back to the 
plaintiffs who must show that the defendants could achieve the same 
procompetitive effects in a less harmful way.74  In practice, the 
overwhelming majority of cases do not get past the first step in the rule of 
reason.75  A 2009 empirical study found that in the preceding decade, 97 
percent of cases under the rule of reason were resolved “on the grounds that 
the plaintiff [could not] show an anticompetitive effect.”76  By far the most 
important question, then, is what plaintiffs must do to make a prima facie 
case.  Much of the Supreme Court precedent in the following analysis 
addresses that question, which has sparked major phase changes in how 
courts addressed antitrust cases over the past century.77 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides, simply:  “Every contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal.”78  Section 2 provides similar language regarding 
monopolies.79  The interpretations of each section diverged significantly 
given the differences between the risks associated with monopolies and those 
resulting from anticompetitive agreements.80  For that reason, the scope of 
the arguments made here is limited to section 1 cases. 
One of the first things the Supreme Court did to grapple with the Sherman 
Act was to confront the fact that section 1 can easily be read to outlaw almost 
every contract or business agreement.81  With 1911’s Standard Oil Co. of 
New Jersey v. United States,82 the Court established that only unreasonable 
restraints of trade are prohibited.83  Discussing the interaction of the Sherman 
Act with the right to freely make and enforce contracts, the Court found that 
Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to restrain freedom to contract but 
rather to enhance it by punishing only those agreements that “unduly or 
 
 71. See, e.g., 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW:  AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1502 (3d ed. 2010). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason:  An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 
16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 837 (2009). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See generally Gavil, supra note 8 (tracing the major shifts in the application of the 
rule of reason). 
 78. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 79. Id. § 2. 
 80. See, e.g., Mark R. Patterson, The Market Power Requirement in Antitrust Rule of 
Reason Cases:  A Rhetorical History, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2000). 
 81. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 193 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d 
sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
 82. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
 83. Id. at 54–55; see also The Antitrust Laws, supra note 42. 
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improperly” harmed others’ ability to compete.84  The Court’s emphasis on 
freedom to contract reflects a focus similar to that of the Sherman Act’s 
drafters; the liberty of citizens to do business as they please was worth 
protecting in itself, apart from economic efficiency and consumer prices and 
perhaps more vital to maintaining healthy democracy.85  The Court returned 
to the rule of reason a year later in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,86 
where it clarified that section 1 outlaws only behavior that, on balance, 
impedes free competition.87  Contracts that restrict the behavior of certain 
parties but serve to increase other competitive behavior do not, therefore, 
necessarily violate the Sherman Act.88  Again the focus was on the behavior 
itself, independent of consumer prices. 
In the decades following Standard Oil and Chicago Board of Trade, the 
Court moved away from a facts-driven, effects-centered analysis and turned 
with increasing regularity to the doctrine of per se illegality.89  United States 
v. Trenton Potteries Co.,90 handed down in 1927, categorically outlawed 
price-fixing agreements even if the agreed price was not necessarily 
“unreasonable.”91  In the ensuing four decades, the Court added division of 
markets, group boycotts, and tying arrangements to the pile of per se illegal 
behavior.92  Under the per se doctrine, plaintiffs’ burden is very low:  all they 
must do to prove their case is show that defendants’ conduct falls into a 
restricted category.93  If it does, it is presumptively and irrebuttably illegal.94 
During this period, the Court espoused an increasingly binary view of 
antitrust law:  defendants whose behavior fell under the per se umbrella were 
swiftly condemned, but outside of those cases the plaintiffs’ burden was 
extremely high and rarely met.95  This categorical approach was, in one 
sense, a continuation of the prior focus on competitor behavior relative to 
consumer prices.  The binary approach to antitrust law suffers from fatal 
weaknesses, however.  First, where certain conduct is not easily categorized 
according to the lines already drawn, the administrative costs in attempting 
to parse it can be huge.96  The per se doctrine is also ripe for manipulation, 
and both sides of a lawsuit will go to great lengths to label the restraint a 
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certain way.97  Finally, some of the per se categories simply made little or no 
sense and seemed to be the result of particular cases or happenstance.98 
Starting in the mid-1970s, the Court began to back away from the per se 
doctrine.  It refocused its attention on demonstrable competitive effects in 
individual cases and adopted a more economic approach in its reasoning, 
relying heavily on market definition and market share to make inferences 
about market power.99  By the mid-1980s, a third category beyond per se and 
the rule of reason had emerged—a middle ground between the two—which 
enabled plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case without conducting an in-
depth economic analysis but still offered defendants the opportunity to rebut 
a finding of anticompetitive effects.100  Called the quick-look doctrine, it is 
suggestive of the Court’s reluctance to delve into the numbers or seek 
testimony from economists where it can rely on other evidence.101  It is a 
reassertion of antitrust law’s purpose of protecting competitive behavior, not 
merely competitive prices.102  By the turn of the millennium, the categories 
of per se, quick look, and the rule of reason were well established, and the 
plaintiff’s burden in any given case depended on which category the alleged 
restraint fell into.103 
But the evolution did not stop there.  The Supreme Court unleashed an 
updated conception of the antitrust plaintiffs’ burden in 1999’s California 
Dental Ass’n v. FTC.104  The opinion denounced all categorical boundaries 
such as quick look and per se.105  Rather, the Court found that the weight of 
the plaintiffs’ burden in showing anticompetitive effects is a continuum 
depending on how inherently suspicious the behavior at issue is: 
[T]here is generally no categorical line to be drawn between restraints that 
give rise to an intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effect and 
those that call for more detailed treatment.  What is required, rather, is an 
enquiry meet for the case, looking to the circumstances, details, and logic 
of a restraint.106 
This “enquiry meet for the case” approach has been roundly criticized by 
commentators as vague and bound to further complicate antitrust cases.107  
But it leaves room for lower courts to craft rules about what level of scrutiny 
should apply to what types of behavior.  Here is an opportunity to rethink 
antitrust policy in an important way, and to perhaps be guided by the 
forgotten purposes of the Sherman Act’s drafters:  the complete freedom of 
 
 97. See id. at 1232–48. 
 98. Id. at 1248–55. 
 99. Gavil, supra note 8, at 744–51. 
 100. See, e.g., id. at 751–53. 
 101. See infra Part II.C. 
 102. See infra Part II.C. 
 103. See, e.g., Gavil, supra note 8, at 755–56. 
 104. 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
 105. Id. at 780–81. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See, e.g., Gavil, supra note 8, at 764–66; Hovenkamp, supra note 70, at 108; 
Markham, supra note 10, at 642–45; Stucke, supra note 24, at 1411–12. 
1144 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
economic actors to pursue competitive strategies and the protection of 
political liberty and democratic institutions from threats posed by 
concentration of economic power.108 
To reduce uncertainty in litigation and in the market, courts should be clear 
on how they will decide where along the California Dental continuum the 
plaintiffs’ burden will fall.  One of the most important questions is whether 
and where to require an independent showing of market power.109  Arguably, 
there could be some point on the spectrum of inherent anticompetitiveness 
beyond which no separate showing of market power is needed as a matter of 
law.  This idea is developed further in Part III.  The remainder of this Part 
discusses market power as an element of the antitrust plaintiff’s burden, the 
goal being to clarify its usefulness and its pitfalls before considering the best 
role for market definition, which arises in the context of market power. 
C.  Market Power as a Separate Element 
It is a common assumption that antitrust plaintiffs must prove two separate 
elements to prevail under the rule of reason:  (1) market power and (2) 
anticompetitive conduct.110  Under section 1, however, it is far from settled 
whether the plaintiffs’ burden includes an independent demonstration or 
measurement of market power.111  The idea of such a requirement in section 
1 cases was an invention of then professor Richard Posner, tucked into a 1981 
law review article112 and then brought with him to the Seventh Circuit the 
following year.113  While only the Seventh and Fourth Circuits have an 
explicit market-power requirement under section 1, its role as a dispositive 
issue is ubiquitous across the district and circuit courts.114 
The principal advantage of this approach is the screen it provides:  an 
opportunity to dispose of potentially complex and time-consuming cases 
quickly.115  This is a legitimate purpose not to be taken lightly.  Antitrust 
trials can last for months and involve in-depth testimony from economic 
experts.116  Courts are right to be careful about wasting valuable time and 
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resources on potentially frivolous cases.  Furthermore, the market-power 
screen provides some certainty and consistency in outcomes.117 
On the other hand, the costs of dismissing meritorious cases cannot be 
ignored.  How much anticompetitive behavior slips through the cracks in the 
name of efficiency and certainty?  Whether a separate market power element 
provides an effective screen for antitrust cases under section 1 is an open 
question.  The remainder of this section addresses that question, in other 
words, whether plaintiffs should be required to offer separate evidence—
beyond the nature of the agreement and its effects—showing that the 
defendants’ market power exceeds some predetermined level to meet their 
initial burden under the rule of reason. 
It is of course true that a firm cannot commit an anticompetitive offense 
without the power to do so; market power is a factual predicate for the 
violation.118  Furthermore, as the actual level of market power decreases, the 
likelihood of a procompetitive justification for the act in question 
increases.119  Anticompetitive goals cannot explain agreements between 
firms with no market power if the firms are acting rationally in their own 
economic interest.120  But the implication of using market power as a screen 
before evaluating the conduct in question is that there is some measure of 
market power that is a better predictor of anticompetitive effects than the 
nature of the conduct itself.121  There is little evidence on which to base such 
an assumption.122 
Additionally, there are significant costs to requiring separate proof of 
market power.  These costs come not from the recognition of market power’s 
factual significance to whether an agreement has anticompetitive effects but 
in separating its analysis from that of the conduct at issue.  Scholars 
increasingly take the position that the two elements cannot be properly 
understood independently from one another and that setting out to measure 
market power in a silo is the wrong approach.123  Professor Louis Kaplow 
has argued convincingly that market power affects antitrust liability through 
different “channels of relevance” and is almost never uniformly 
anticompetitive or procompetitive in its effects.124  To start with, Kaplow 
argues that every antitrust case should be concerned with the probability of 
possible harm, the probable magnitude of that harm, the probability of 
benefits to competition, and the probable magnitude of such benefits.125  That 
is a minimum of four channels of relevance on which market power operates.  
It may be a procompetitive force in one channel and anticompetitive in 
 
 117. See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden, Why (Ever) Define Markets?:  An Answer to Professor 
Kaplow, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 729, 740–41, 746 (2013). 
 118. See Patterson, supra note 80, at 2. 
 119. Hovenkamp, supra note 70, at 107. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Patterson, supra note 80, at 39–40. 
 122. See id.; see also Kaplow, supra note 10, at 1375–77. 
 123. Crane, supra note 23, at 32–33; see also Kaplow, supra note 10, at 1406. 
 124. Kaplow, supra note 10, at 1322–54. 
 125. Id. at 1307–08. 
1146 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
another, and its effect in each case depends on the nature of the agreement.126  
While it is true that firms with more market power can generally do more 
harm with anticompetitive behavior, any procompetitive effects of their 
behavior may be magnified by the same degree.127  If cases turn on 
measurements of market power, there is a risk of sacrificing procompetitive 
behavior by powerful firms, either from false positives or from risk-averse 
business decisions.128  The current legal thinking mostly ignores this 
reality.129 
Furthermore, market power is difficult to measure and the seemingly most 
straightforward ways to do so can be particularly unhelpful.130  By far the 
most common method is market share, but antitrust scholars and practitioners 
are increasingly realizing that market share is often a poor indicator of the 
probability of anticompetitive effects.131  The standard approach has been to 
(1) define the relevant market by including or excluding possible substitutes 
for the product, (2) determine defendants’ market share, (3) use that 
information to infer whether defendants possess market power, and only then 
(4) decide whether defendants have used that power to cause anticompetitive 
effects.132  As is discussed in Part II, the problems with this approach begin 
with the very first step.  In searching for a better approach, one might 
consider other potential indicators of market power.  Daniel Crane conducted 
an investigation into the use of entry barriers, profit margins, price 
discrimination, pricing discontinuity, exclusionary conduct, diversion ratios, 
and benchmarks as ways to infer market power.133  Each proved to have 
significant weaknesses and none worked well across the board.134 
Perhaps it is time to give up on a simple market-power indicator acting as 
an effective screen for lawsuits under section 1.  Instead, courts should look 
more closely at the way market power operates and begin to craft rules about 
when a separate showing of market power is necessary and when it is not.  
Supreme Court precedent is clear that there is no blanket requirement for 
stand-alone proof of market power under the rule of reason.135  At best, 
market power is one of several important factors to be considered.136  Its 
complexity and variance as a competitive force, however, make its effects 
difficult to pin down.137  Courts often use it as a reason to dismiss cases after 
market definition has revealed a low market share or has failed altogether.138  
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This makes market definition an important area of focus in clarifying the 
proper role of market power analysis in section 1 cases. 
II.  THE MARKET DEFINITION BEHEMOTH 
It is perhaps not surprising that judges faced with an antitrust action where 
the effects of an agreement are not immediately evident would first seek to 
define the market.  It is clear that market power must exist for anticompetitive 
effects to take place.139  If defendants can show they lack market power, the 
court can dismiss the case without further thought.140  This seems a proper 
and efficient approach at first glance; if an issue is going to be dispositive, 
better to decide it early before everyone wastes their time and money.141  To 
evaluate market power in a silo like this, courts look for something to 
measure.142  Typically, plaintiffs must prove that defendants possess market 
power by calculating their share of sales in a “properly defined relevant 
market.”143  The result is often a “battle between the ‘we-win because it is a 
narrow market’ plaintiffs and the ‘you-lose because it is a broad market’ 
defendants.”144  As this Part will show, that approach is fraught with 
uncertainty.  Error costs are high for the courts and for businesses trying to 
make strategic decisions.145  Furthermore, the guidance provided by the 
Supreme Court regarding market definition does not support such a large and 
decisive role in the process.146  This Part first discusses the economics of 
market definition, how it is used to make inferences about market power, and 
the principal arguments regarding its role in section 1 cases.  It then addresses 
what the Supreme Court has said about market definition and concludes that 
a scaled-back role is consistent with the case law. 
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A.  Economics of Market Definition 
Market definition emerges most often as a step towards making inferences 
about the defendants’ level of market power.  According to the authors of 
antitrust law’s most authoritative treatise, market power exists “when the 
defendant (1) can profitably set prices well above its costs and (2) enjoys 
some protection against rivals’ entry or expansion that would erode such 
supracompetitive prices and profits.”147  In other words, it is the ability to 
raise prices “well above” costs and keep them there without losing business 
to rivals.148  Since market power is a factual predicate for an antitrust 
violation, it is a natural pillar for defendants to attack and measurements of 
market power can be powerful tools.149  There are more direct measures of 
market power than market share, however, and it is worth exploring why 
those are not used more often in antirust cases. 
One possibility is the Lerner index, which measures the degree to which a 
given price exceeds the marginal costs to the firm to produce the product.150  
Theoretically, in a perfectly competitive market, all firms produce at the level 
where price equals marginal cost.151  The Lerner index is an indication of 
how far the actual price deviates from the perfectly competitive price, a 
textbook measure of market power.152  It presents practical difficulties, 
however.  First, the marginal cost of a particular product can be hard to 
measure, and second, prices will almost always exceed marginal costs to a 
certain degree, so the firm can cover its fixed costs and recover its initial 
investment.153  It is often difficult to surmise how much of a difference 
between price and marginal costs is legitimate given these considerations.154  
Put another way, it is difficult to figure out exactly what the competitive price 
is or should be. 
Another basic economic indicator of market power is the price elasticity 
of demand, or “the percentage change of the quantity demanded of some 
good in response to a given price change.”155  Where a firm can raise the 
price of its product and suffer little or no reduction in sales, it has a low price 
elasticity of demand.156  If a raise in price causes consumers to turn 
somewhere else, resulting in a loss in sales of the product, that product has a 
higher price elasticity of demand.157  If market power is defined as the ability 
to raise prices beyond competitive levels without suffering a decrease in 
demand, it follows logically that the lower a product’s price elasticity of 
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demand, the higher the market power of the firm producing it.158  In the 
context of section 1, if a defendant can show their product has a high price 
elasticity of demand, it can argue its lack of market power precludes it from 
exerting anticompetitive effects on the market.159 
Both the Lerner index and price elasticity of demand are ways to represent 
market power in the language of economics, but they are not numbers 
practitioners can easily and reliably calculate with commonly available data 
and use to accurately measure it.160  As a result, courts have turned to 
numbers they can calculate in order to make inferences about market power, 
namely market share, which can only be measured if a market is defined.161 
The way most courts go about defining the market is to allow defendants 
to argue that certain other products should be considered substitutes and thus 
included in the market for the market share calculation.162  To decide whether 
a given substitute should be included in the relevant market, courts look to 
measure or estimate the cross elasticity of demand of the product and the 
possible substitute.163  Cross elasticity of demand is the measure of the 
change in demand for one product caused by a change in the price for a 
different product.164  Where this measure is high, the products are deemed 
substitutes.165  If defendants can establish that substitutes for its products are 
available, they can argue that the inquiry must focus on competition in the 
broader market consisting of the defendants’ product plus those substitutes, 
thus lowering the defendants’ relative market share.166  Cross elasticity of 
demand has become the subject of extensive expert testimony from 
economists in antitrust cases.167 
This process is vulnerable to errors at every step.  The next section seeks 
to identify these errors and consider their general likelihood and cost.  It 
concludes that the current market definition process is costlier than it is worth 
and courts should, at the very least, scale back their use of it. 
B.  Error and Efficiency Costs of Market Definition 
The exercise of including or excluding certain products in the relevant 
market presents the risk of two types of errors.168  Either products that do 
provide significant competitive constraints are excluded or products that do 
not do so are included.169  Any errors of either type will lead to mistaken 
inferences about market power, which can be dispositive and are likely to 
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disrupt the whole ensuing analysis.170  Hard data about how often these errors 
occur or their cost is not available, but inconsistency in how courts decide 
what products to include and extreme variance in outcomes suggests they are 
frequent.171  In many cases, the opposing sides will present opinions from 
highly credentialed experts at the opposite extremes of the relevant market 
spectrum.172  This makes the result more arbitrary and heavily dependent on 
the persuasiveness of the lawyers and experts for each side.173  If there was 
consensus on a clear and reliable way to determine which products should be 
included in the market, one would expect arguments to take place more at the 
margins.174 
Additionally, the binary nature of this market definition approach does not 
reflect the reality of economic competition.175  Products are labeled either 
inside or outside the relevant market, and once they are found to be inside it, 
the level of competition each product provides to the defendant’s product is 
inferred from its market share.176  This fails to recognize that products can 
have different levels of substitutability, i.e., a product with a smaller market 
share can exert more pressure if it is a closer substitute than one with a larger 
market share but a lower cross elasticity of demand.177  Product 
differentiation—where products that serve the exact same function are 
different enough, or marketed as such, to affect consumer decisions178—
further complicates the issue, making it even more difficult to determine how 
consumers will react to price changes.179 
This inflexibility and extreme divergence in opposing positions on market 
definition create uncertainty for both plaintiffs and defendants.180  It falls 
harder on plaintiffs, however, since they bear the burden of proving that 
defendants have market power in the relevant market.181  As discussed above, 
the most common result in rule of reason cases is dismissal because plaintiffs 
fail to make a prima facie case for anticompetitive effects.182  While it is 
impossible to gather definitive statistics about how often courts get the wrong 
answer in these cases, i.e., dismiss a case where anticompetitive effects are 
present (false negative) or allow one to proceed where they are clearly not 
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(false positive), there are strong indications that the error rate in antitrust 
cases is particularly high.183 
The cost of these errors is vast.  A false positive will lead to millions of 
dollars in unnecessary litigation costs, and the fear of false positives may lead 
businesses to abstain from procompetitive behavior that would benefit its 
competitors and consumers.184  False negatives allow businesses to continue 
impeding competition, which can result in competitors’ failure and billions 
of dollars in overcharges to consumers.185  Given that market definition is 
often decisive and occupies much of courts’ time in antitrust cases, it is a 
natural area to focus on in any attempt to reduce error costs under the rule of 
reason.  The uncertainty surrounding market definition, and its potential to 
end cases, leads defense attorneys to devote vast resources to arguing the 
issue.186  If courts continue allowing this, expenditures in time and money 
are potentially limitless, as is the complexity of the testimony.  Antitrust trials 
can drag on for months, with testimony from dozens of expert witnesses.187  
Courts’ valuable time is wasted where market definition could be dispensed 
with quickly. 
The complexity of antitrust cases and the resources required to prosecute 
them under the current approach contribute to a severe dearth of trials in the 
field.188  Heightened pleading requirements, higher standards for expert 
witnesses, and higher burdens for class certification have also contributed to 
the vanishing of the antitrust trial in recent years, especially those before a 
jury.189  This dearth of jury trials is particularly problematic in antitrust 
enforcement because antitrust cases have implications beyond the individual 
litigants and may affect the broad structure of economic relations in 
significant ways.190 
Juries provide a significant check on judicial power.191  In antitrust cases, 
where judges tend to incorporate their own opinions about economic policy 
into their decisions, this check is arguably more important than usual.192  Jury 
trials force attorneys to simplify their arguments and present them as clearly 
and efficiently as possible.193  A larger sample of jury trials would allow the 
general public to weigh in on important antitrust issues using common sense 
gleaned from their everyday experience.194  This could be a refreshing 
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injection into a field bogged down in complex economic theory. More 
verdicts would make settlement negotiations more reflective of possible 
judgment amounts and the probability of success in certain types of cases.195  
Without enough data to look at, antitrust lawyers operate largely in the dark 
when they negotiate settlements, so it is very difficult to tell whether these 
adequately address defendants’ wrongdoing.196  The private deterrent 
operates best where settlement amounts accurately reflect the harm 
caused.197 
The likelihood that market definition results in substantial error costs and 
inefficiency is enough that courts should look hard at finding a better way to 
proceed under the rule of reason.  In particular, the presumption that plaintiffs 
must prove a relevant market to bear their initial burden under section 1 rule 
of reason cases should be eliminated.  Fortunately, under Supreme Court 
precedent, courts have room to adjust how they approach market definition.  
The next section discusses what the Court has said about market definition 
and concludes that a lesser role is consistent with the relevant case law. 
C.  Market Definition in the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court recognized and addressed the potential for confusion 
around market definition in Standard Oil, the rule of reason’s foundational 
case.198  The Court explicitly stated that the Sherman Act applied to any part 
of interstate commerce that is affected: 
The commerce referred to by the words “any part” construed in the light of 
the manifest purpose of the statute has both a geographical and a 
distributive significance, that is it includes any portion of the United States 
and any one of the classes of things forming a part of interstate or foreign 
commerce.199 
The Court acknowledged that certain behavior might be anticompetitive even 
if it does not negatively affect the widest relevant market, so long as it affects 
some class of market participants.200 
For several decades following Standard Oil, the Court returned to the issue 
mainly to narrow the focus of its inquiry.  In Indiana Farmer’s Guide 
Publishing Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publishing Co.,201 for example, the Court 
asserted that “sections 1 and 2 . . . apply to any part of the United States as 
distinguished from the whole and to any part of the classes of things forming 
a part of interstate commerce.”202  In both Lorain Journal Co. v. United 
States203 and Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,204 the Court 
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addressed two-sided markets for newspaper advertising.  In both cases, it 
defined the market for advertisers and for readers as separate and addressed 
anticompetitive effects on the advertiser side without considering the effects 
on readers.205 
The seed of the modern market definition paradigm seems to be 1956’s 
United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,206 a monopoly case under 
section 2 of the Sherman Act.207  In a notorious argument which has become 
known to many commentators as the “cellophane fallacy,”208 the Court found 
a lack of monopoly power for a manufacturer of cellophane because 
consumers could easily switch to wax paper, aluminum foil, or some other 
type of food wrapping in response to a price increase for cellophane.209  To 
calculate the cross elasticity of demand between cellophane and those 
products, however, the Court used the actual current price of cellophane as a 
baseline, failing to account for the possibility that the price was already 
supracompetitive.210  In deciding whether the defendants possessed market 
power, the Court ignored any market power that the firm already exercised, 
evaluating only its potential unused market power.211  This case represents 
early and strong evidence that the market definition process is highly prone 
to errors.  Even as commentators largely agreed that du Pont rested on faulty 
reasoning, defendants began putting increasing weight on similar arguments, 
introducing measures of cross elasticity of demand to prove that additional 
products should be included in the relevant market, and lower courts proved 
willing to entertain them.212 
The Court confirmed the importance of cross elasticity of demand in 
market definition with Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,213 handed down in 
1962.214  It qualified that endorsement, however, with a recognition that 
within properly defined markets “well-defined submarkets may exist which, 
in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust purposes.”215  When 
using cross elasticity to define a market, then, one cannot ignore evidence of 
competitive forces operating on some narrower submarket, even when a 
broader market seems proper at first glance.  Here, the Court recognized the 
danger of separating the market definition inquiry from the conduct itself. 
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United States v. Grinnell Corp.,216 handed down in 1966, presented a 
novel challenge for the Court in defining the product market.  The case 
concerned monopolization of the market for certain home security services.  
The defendant provided centralized comprehensive home security systems, 
i.e., fire alarm, sprinkler, and burglar alarm systems linked to a central 
command center with employees who responded to the alarms.217  
Defendants argued the services they offered were so diverse that they could 
not be grouped together into one relevant market.218  In other words, firms 
offering only one of the services should be considered substitutes because 
consumers could buy the services separately if the price for the central 
service got too high.  While acknowledging that there was a certain level of 
cross elasticity between the defendant’s product and more differentiated 
services and devices, the Court found that the submarket for centralized 
comprehensive services was a relevant market on which competitive forces 
could operate and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on the issue.219 
Next came NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,220 
where the Court stated explicitly that under the rule of reason, neither proof 
of market power nor elaborate market definition analysis is necessary where 
there is evidence a restraint causes price or output to be decoupled from 
consumer demand.221  Two years after NCAA, the Supreme Court handed 
down FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists222 (“IFD”), where it expanded 
the rule to include cases beyond naked restrictions on price or output.223  In 
that case, a group of dentists agreed not to provide x-rays to insurance 
companies, who had a policy of reviewing them to evaluate the cost-
effectiveness of dental treatment.224  In concluding that these agreements 
were anticompetitive, the Court relied on the FTC’s factual finding that in 
the absence of the agreements, many dentists would have complied with the 
requests for x-rays.225  Without a demonstration of procompetitive effects by 
the defendants, this was enough.226  The Court required neither a definition 
of the relevant market nor evidence that the costs of dental treatment actually 
increased.227  Discussed further below, the reasoning of this case provides a 
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good foundation for a modern rule regarding market definition under section 
1. 
The Supreme Court has not altered course since IFD.  California Dental 
acknowledged that case,228 as did Amex.229  So with the knowledge that 
market definition is not a requirement under section 1 and that the level of 
the plaintiffs’ initial burden is a continuum dependent on the nature of the 
agreement, the task then is to surmise where on the continuum plaintiffs start 
to be required to define the market explicitly and what characteristics of an 
agreement warrant a place higher or lower on that continuum. 
III.  WHEN TO AVOID MARKET DEFINITION:  THE PROPOSED RULE 
The first step any court must take under the rule of reason is to decide how 
heavy the plaintiffs’ initial burden is; where on the California Dental 
continuum230 does the type of behavior at issue fall?  To answer the question, 
one must consider on what characteristics the burden continuum depends.  
What makes one agreement inherently more suspect than another?  There are 
a few ways to go about answering that question.  One is the categorical 
approach, where certain categories of agreement are tagged as 
anticompetitive and the question becomes whether the agreement in question 
falls into one of those categories.  But the Supreme Court has clearly 
disavowed the categorical approach in antitrust, favoring more flexibility.231  
A potential alternative is an effects-centered approach, not in terms of the 
final price for consumers but based on the effects the agreement has on the 
freedom of other economic actors to pursue particular competitive strategies. 
If an ideal world is one where competing firms can attempt any and all 
strategies, with consumers picking the winners according to some calculation 
of price, quality, branding, availability, etc.—the result being a constant 
evolution of better-quality products and more efficient production and 
marketing of those products—then any agreement that prevents firms from 
employing certain competitive strategies should be highly suspicious.  
Applying this premise in the market definition context, one can imagine a 
rule worded something like this:  under section 1 of the Sherman Act, where 
plaintiffs present evidence that an agreement more likely than not prevents a 
class of economic actors, beyond the willing parties to the agreement, from 
engaging in some competitive strategy that they otherwise would have 
pursued, the result should be a prima facie finding of unreasonable 
anticompetitive effects.  At that point, defendants must defend their behavior 
before the court considers arguments on market definition or market power. 
Importantly, the rule does not cover agreements that merely restrict the 
behavior of the parties, only those that would prevent a wider class of actors 
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from engaging in some competitive strategy or where parties are effectively 
forced to participate in the agreement.  Therefore, it does not infringe on the 
right of businesses to freely contract.  Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving 
that, absent the agreement, those actors more likely than not would have 
engaged in the competitive strategy. 
Another way to interpret the rule is as a presumption:  agreements that 
eliminate entire competitive strategies are anticompetitive, absent a 
procompetitive justification, regardless of any separate market-power 
measurement.  It can also be phrased like this:  where entire competitive 
strategies are blocked by an agreement, the parties necessarily have market 
power.  Whatever conception makes the most sense, the reader is encouraged 
to keep that in mind when this Note refers to “the proposed rule.”  The 
remainder of this Part examines that rule, its consistency or lack thereof with 
Supreme Court precedent and economic theory, how it would apply in 
practice, some potential criticisms, and its likely effect on the consistency 
and efficiency of antitrust prosecutions.  It concludes with a case study of 
how the rule would apply in pharmaceutical pay-for-delay lawsuits. 
A.  Origins in the Supreme Court 
The foundation of the rule comes from IFD, which confirmed that market 
definition is not required under section 1.232  Unfortunately, the opinion did 
not clarify much beyond the fact that direct evidence of anticompetitive 
effects obviated the need for market definition, and lower courts have 
produced varying interpretations of what constitutes such direct evidence.233  
A deeper look into the IFD opinion, however, reveals the Supreme Court’s 
concern with the elimination of a particular competitive strategy.234  The 
evidence in that case showed that the Indiana Federation of Dentists was able 
to prevent all dentists in certain geographic areas from submitting x-rays to 
insurance companies, who had a policy of reviewing them to ensure dentists 
were using cost-effective treatments.235  The anticompetitive effect that 
obviated the need for a market definition was that “insurers in [certain] areas 
were, over a period of years, actually unable to obtain compliance with their 
requests for submission of x rays.”236  The very next sentence in the opinion, 
often quoted, declares the rule that “‘proof of actual detrimental effects’ . . . 
can obviate the need for an inquiry into market power, which is but a 
‘surrogate for detrimental effects.’”237  Proof of an increased price for dental 
services was not a requirement, just the fact that the practice of obtaining x-
rays was blocked.238 
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Lower courts have responded to IFD with a hodgepodge of attempts to 
categorize behavior that constitutes direct evidence of anticompetitive 
effects.239  One common interpretation is that proof of increased price and 
decreased output obviates the need for an inquiry into market definition or 
market power,240 but the IFD Court clearly imagined a lower bar than that;241 
in fact it explicitly stated that proof of increased price was not necessary.242  
Others argue that IFD makes sense only as a quick-look case and that it 
turned less on any direct evidence than on the inherently suspect nature of 
the agreement, which immediately shifted the burden to the defendants.243  
Whether it is considered direct evidence of anticompetitive effects or 
inherently suspect behavior, the key was that the insurers were blocked as a 
group from undertaking a competitive strategy. 
The other case requiring attention is California Dental.  Here, the proposed 
rule is best understood as a marker somewhere along the inherently suspect 
spectrum.244  Evidence that the rule is satisfied should mean that the burden 
is somewhere on the lower end of the spectrum.  Additionally, if the burden 
is on the lower end of the spectrum, courts should avoid market definition.  
This conception is entirely in line with California Dental’s reasoning; in fact, 
it adds value to that decision by providing some guidance on how to 
determine the “enquiry meet for the case.”245 
Recently, the Court has shown further signs that it recognizes the limits of 
market power as a separate element.  In FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,246 for example, 
it found that where certain settlement agreements in patent litigation 
surrounding branded and generic pharmaceuticals contained evidence of a 
payment from the brand manufacturer to the generic in exchange for a 
promise to stay off the market for a certain time, a large enough payment 
eliminates the need for a separate inquiry into market power.247  The size of 
the payment reflects its value to the brand manufacturer, which can only 
come from charging prices above what they would charge in the presence of 
generic competition.  The ability to do just that is often pointed to as the 
definition of market power, so a high payment is evidence enough of the 
likelihood of anticompetitive harm.248  While the rule in Actavis is narrow, it 
shows that plaintiffs can meet their burden under the rule of reason without 
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a separate showing of market power and without direct evidence of increased 
price or decreased output.  Where and when they should be able to do that is 
the focus of the proposed rule and of the rest of this Note. 
B.  Application of the Rule 
The goal of this section is to test the proposed rule against common types 
of antitrust cases.  It is not meant to advocate in favor of a categorical view 
of antitrust law, and the rule applies the same to all categories of cases.  That 
said, there are similar fact patterns that emerge again and again in antitrust, 
and it is useful to apply the proposed rule to those patterns and identify where 
results would differ from the status quo.  The chosen fact patterns are resale 
price maintenance, exclusive dealing, group boycotts, and price-fixing.249  
These provide a diverse enough sample to make some meaningful inferences. 
1.  Resale Price Maintenance 
Resale price maintenance—where a manufacturer establishes a minimum 
retail price dealers may charge for its product250—was per se illegal until 
2007’s Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,251 in which the 
Court overturned precedent and ruled that the practice be dealt with under 
the rule of reason.252  In its opinion, the Court pointed to the possibilities for 
both anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of such policies.253  
Sometimes, resale price maintenance can give consumers more options and 
promote market entry by new firms or brands.254  Other times, the policies 
can facilitate horizontal cartels among manufacturers or retailers.255  They 
can also be abused by powerful firms to, for example, “forestall innovation 
in distribution that decreases costs.”256 
To remain consistent with this interpretation of resale price maintenance, 
the proposed rule should be satisfied only under certain conditions, and that 
turns out to be the case.  Where resale price agreements merely restrict the 
sellers of the manufacturer’s product and do not block other manufacturers 
from competing with lower-priced products, the rule is not satisfied because 
the low-price strategy is still viable.  Where it can be shown that resale price 
maintenance either facilitates reseller cartels which prevent price competition 
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or where single firms abuse the practice to stifle innovation in efficiency and 
cost savings, the rule would dictate that the defendants must demonstrate 
procompetitive effects; otherwise, the plaintiffs should prevail. 
After the Leegin decision, the case was reheard on remand under the rule 
of reason.  The Eastern District of Texas found that the plaintiff “ha[d] not 
pleaded a tenable product market for a rule of reason analysis” and granted 
Leegin’s motion to dismiss.257  The Fifth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari.258  The district court’s opinion focused entirely on 
market definition and never analyzed the nature of the agreements or their 
effects.259  In a rehearing of the case under the proposed rule, the first 
question would be different.  Not what is the relevant market but is there 
evidence that a class of actors was prevented from undertaking a competitive 
strategy? 
The facts alleged in Leegin did not include evidence that the policy 
affected any economic actors beyond the parties to the agreement.260  The 
products at issue were leather fashion accessories.261  Leegin’s resale price 
policies were intended to maintain a reputation for the brand as high-end.262  
No evidence was presented indicating that other manufacturers were 
prevented from pursuing a low-cost strategy, that the policy had facilitated 
cartel behavior among retailers, or that retailers were forced to agree in the 
face of possible destruction.263  Assuming that no evidence of this existed, 
the facts would not have been enough to satisfy the rule.  The district court’s 
decision on remand is thus consistent with the proposed rule.  Since the rule 
was not satisfied, the plaintiffs would need to take another route to meet their 
initial burden.  Whether the market definition analysis conducted by the 
district court was coherent or correct is beyond the scope of this Note, but to 
use such an analysis with this fact pattern is consistent with the proposed rule. 
An example of where resale price maintenance may fall afoul of the 
proposed rule is Babyage.com, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc.264  In that case, 
several manufacturers of baby products instituted minimum resale prices.  
Evidence suggested that Babies “R” Us, the largest retailer for baby products, 
orchestrated an arrangement among the manufacturers to set the policies.265  
Competitor retailers alleged that while they had been able to compete with 
Babies “R” Us by undercutting its prices before the resale price minimums, 
that strategy was no longer viable. The new price minimums were too high 
for these retailers to draw customers away from Babies “R” Us nor could 
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they offer enough selection without access the manufacturers’ products.266  
Furthermore, there was evidence that the resale price maintenance policies 
were not in the economic interest of each manufacturer, but were the result 
of threats from Babies “R” Us to drop the manufacturers’ products if they did 
not comply.267 
This evidence presents a great example of where market definition is 
unnecessary.  Without market power, Babies “R” Us could not have coerced 
the manufacturers into the resale price minimums; it was only because each 
of them depended on Babies “R” Us for so much of their sales that they could 
not afford to refuse.268  Furthermore, the only way these policies stood to 
benefit Babies “R” Us was by eliminating price competition.269  It is also a 
great example of how the proposed rule would function.  Plaintiffs explicitly 
alleged that their strategy of undercutting Babies “R” Us on price was 
thwarted by the policies and that Babies “R” Us coercively orchestrated the 
policies, which were not in the manufacturers’ own economic interests.270  
This type of allegation, if plausible, should be enough to take a case past a 
motion to dismiss. 
While the court considered the evidence described above in its opinion 
denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss, it turned first to whether the 
plaintiffs had met their burden on the “relevant-market element.”271  To do 
so, it stated, the plaintiffs must define the relevant market “with reference to 
cross elasticity of demand” and must not “clearly fail to encompass all 
‘interchangeable substitute products.’”272  Only by alleging with “enough 
heft” that “a hypothetical monopolist could profitably raise prices [in the 
relevant market]” had the plaintiffs passed this test.273  The decision thus sets 
up market definition as an issue for trial and, by pointing to the need for 
“heft” in the allegations at the motion to dismiss stage, it arguably suggests 
the need for similarly hefty proof at trial. 
Under the proposed rule, the evidence regarding coercion by Babies “R” 
Us would be enough to clear a motion to dismiss.  If Babies “R” Us was able 
to force manufacturers to agree against their own economic interests, it 
necessarily possesses market power.  If plaintiffs can prove those facts, then, 
there should be no need to prove a relevant market using cross elasticity of 
demand.  The case can be tried on the issues of whether Babies “R” Us 
coerced the manufacturers into the resale price maintenance policies and 
whether these policies affected the viability of the competing retailers’ low-
cost strategies. 
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In sum, where resale price maintenance takes the form of agreements 
between willing parties and does not effectively block firms from pursuing 
low-price strategies outside the agreement, the rule would not be satisfied.  
Where such strategies are blocked, or if firms are forced to agree, it would 
be satisfied. 
2.  Exclusive Dealing 
Exclusive dealing agreements generally prevent distributors or retailers 
from selling products other than those manufactured by the other party to the 
agreement.274  A large food and beverage producer, for example, may want 
to have dedicated distributors in certain areas who carry only its products, to 
insure quality and efficiency standards.  These may also take the form of 
requirements contracts, where a manufacturer agrees to only buy inputs from 
one supplier.275  Courts deal with exclusive dealing under the rule of 
reason,276 and the cases turn largely on the percentage of the market 
foreclosed to the firms outside the agreement.277  Starting in the 1960s, courts 
began to recognize more efficiencies resulting from exclusive dealing 
agreements, and the foreclosure percentage needed to show anticompetitive 
effects rose significantly.278  By the 1990s, most courts would not find 
anticompetitive effects unless more than 40 percent of the market was 
foreclosed.279  Since that time, the focus has shifted somewhat to market 
power, i.e., market share, but foreclosure rates remain an important factor.280 
Analysis under the proposed rule would also focus on foreclosure but 
would differ in looking first at whether any previously viable competitive 
strategies were precluded as a result of the foreclosure.  A 2005 case in the 
Third Circuit, United States v. Dentsply International, Inc.,281 provides a 
good example of exclusive dealing.  Dentsply manufactured artificial teeth 
and sold them to dental supply dealers, who in turn sold them to dental 
laboratories, along with a variety of other products.282  When Dentsply began 
requiring dealers to agree not to carry any of its competitors’ products, the 
Department of Justice challenged the policies under sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act.283  After a bench trial, the 
court found that although Dentsply possessed market power, the restraints 
did not restrict competition because they only applied to dealers, and it was 
 
 274. See Exclusive Dealing or Requirements Contracts, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/dealings-supply-
chain/exclusive-dealing-or [https://perma.cc/T8MQ-G367] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 275. Id. 
 276. Hovenkamp, supra note 70, at 87. 
 277. See Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, Foreclosure, and Consumer Harm, 70 
ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 311–12 (2002). 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at 324. 
 280. 11 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 71, ¶ 1821d. 
 281. 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 282. Id. at 184. 
 283. See United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 277 F. Supp. 2d 387, 390 (D. Del. 2003), 
rev’d, 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005). 
1162 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
still possible for competing manufacturers to sell directly to the dental 
laboratories.284  The government appealed only the ruling on its section 2 
claims, and the Third Circuit reversed, finding that exclusion of competitors 
from the dealer channels allowed Dentsply to preserve its monopoly power 
and was therefore anticompetitive.285 
Applying the proposed rule in this case would have gotten a different result 
in the district court, not because of market definition but because the rule 
recognizes that preclusion of a competitive strategy is an anticompetitive 
effect, even if other strategies remain available.  The district court addressed 
Dentsply’s procompetitive justifications in its opinion, finding them 
“pretextual.”286  Had the court applied the rule to its findings of fact, the 
government would have prevailed on its section 1 claim.  Because the Third 
Circuit never weighed in on that claim it is impossible to say whether that 
too would have been reversed, but the proposed rule would have reached a 
similar finding of anticompetitive effects in a more direct and efficient way.  
This case demonstrates that the proposed rule can provide value even outside 
of the market definition context by focusing courts’ attention immediately on 
the competitive strategies at issue. 
3.  Group Boycotts and Price-Fixing 
Group boycotts, or agreements among competitors not to do business with 
a certain firm or group of firms, were long considered per se illegal.287  Swept 
up in the trend away from per se classification, most group boycott cases are 
now subject to the rule of reason, though most are still found to be 
unlawful.288  Courts have drawn a distinction between naked horizontal 
agreements among competitors to shut out other competitors, which are 
almost always, if not always, anticompetitive and ancillary boycotts, where 
the agreement is motivated by some other, potentially procompetitive 
goal.289  Ancillary boycotts often occur as part of joint ventures between 
smaller firms to coordinate production or distribution with the goal of 
lowering costs for all involved.290  Conversely, a naked boycott’s only 
benefit is the isolation of firms using a particular competitive strategy and 
success inherently depends on the parties possessing sufficient market power 
to cut the strategy off.291  Rational actors would not make the agreements if 
they did not at least believe there was enough market power among them to 
effectuate it.  Most courts recognize that this fact obviates the need for any 
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separate market-power inquiry.292  While perhaps not quite per se illegal, 
naked group boycotts are as close as it gets besides price-fixing.293 
Faced with a more ancillary type of restraint, courts will often turn to 
market power, which is not illogical given the above analysis.294  If there is 
no market power, there is no anticompetitive group boycott.  But all the 
pitfalls of siloing the market-power analysis described above apply.  The 
proposed rule would likely achieve similar results as market definition and 
market share in these ancillary cases but more efficiently and with fewer 
errors.  The analysis should focus on the nature of the agreement and whether 
its success is dependent on exclusion of competitive strategies, not just 
competitors.  Where that is the case, market power can be inferred and the 
court can skip the separate market definition analysis. 
A similar analysis applies to naked horizontal price-fixing, although that 
practice seems likely to remain the one truly per se illegal group of cases.  
Wherever competitors successfully inflate the price they can charge, other 
competitors will be denied the opportunity to capture customers from the 
guilty firms by offering a lower-cost alternative, so the rule is satisfied.295  
Such a result is only possible where the parties to a price-fixing agreement 
have market power. 
The above analysis suggests a few tentative conclusions regarding the 
proposed rule.  First, the results of its application would mirror those of the 
status quo in a sizable chunk of cases, but the evidence used to reach those 
conclusions would be different in many of them.  Second, the proposed rule 
appears to apply well across these categories, suggesting that categorical 
analysis in antitrust cases is unnecessary.  The rule should thus be applied 
without a category in mind and before the court places the case in any such.  
Finally, the rule would refocus analysis in some cases on the freedom of 
action of the accused party’s competitors and away from the exact parameters 
of the relevant market and defendants’ share thereof.  The next section 
responds preemptively to a few potential criticisms of the proposed rule and 
hopefully reinforces its viability while adding to the argument for its 
implementation. 
C.  Potential Criticisms 
The first potential criticism of the proposed rule is that, at its core, it 
provides nothing new.  It can be argued that the rule is simply a restatement 
of the established notion that direct evidence of anticompetitive effects 
obviates the need for a separate market-power analysis.296  The direct-
evidence doctrine is muddled, however, and courts often require direct 
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evidence of increased price.297  The practical effect of this interpretation is 
that plaintiffs must establish what the competitive price is and then establish 
that the agreement caused the actual price to exceed it.298  Identifying a 
competitive price is very difficult and injects more ambiguity and uncertainty 
into the process.299  The proposed rule focuses on the change in economic 
behavior resulting from the agreement, abstracted from the numbers.  It 
punishes behavior that entirely precludes any potential competitive 
strategies.  In one sense, the proposed rule can be understood as a change in 
focus from numbers to behavior.  It is meant to apply far more broadly than 
the current direct-evidence doctrine and is a more efficient way to separate 
the wheat from the chaff than either the market-definition/market-share 
analysis or the direct-evidence analysis. 
Second, one might argue that the proposed rule suffers from the same flaw 
as direct evidence; namely, it will be difficult to show that certain behavior 
would have taken place absent the agreement.  But that issue is inherent in 
antitrust law.300  Liability can only be established by some showing of what 
competition was supposed to look like and how it differed in actuality.301  In 
shifting the focus from establishing a but-for price to a but-for competitive 
strategy, the proposed rule elicits different evidence that is in some cases a 
clearer indicator of anticompetitive effects.  Furthermore, the rule is not 
meant to be easily satisfied.  To prove that a certain strategy more likely than 
not would have been used in a but-for world is a high evidentiary burden, but 
it is often the most telling and most efficient factor on which to rest liability. 
Third, by reducing the role of market definition and market share 
significantly, the rule is open to criticism that it is too pro-plaintiff.  The idea 
that screening through market definition and market share helps avoid 
wrongful punishment of behavior that is actually procompetitive is 
widespread.302  It is part and parcel of the Chicago school of antitrust,303 and 
businesses rely heavily on market-power arguments in defending their 
behavior.304  The aim of this Note is not to discount the market-power screen 
entirely but to point out how completely the issue dominates modern antitrust 
jurisprudence, to question the logical foundations of using it in all rule of 
reason cases, and to point out a subset of cases where it unnecessary and 
inefficient. 
The question of whether the proposed rule is friendlier to plaintiffs than 
the current regime is difficult to answer.  It is probably friendlier to 
defendants who wield significant market power but avoid blocking 
competitors’ strategies and harder on less powerful firms who are 
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nonetheless able to snuff them out.  That seems a desirable outcome on its 
face.  The most significant implication of the proposed rule is not that more 
or fewer plaintiffs will prevail but how those that do will get there. 
D.  Implications of the Rule 
Perhaps the most persuasive arguments for implementing the proposed 
rule are the effects it would have on the process of prosecuting antitrust cases.  
The best way to examine those potential results is to go step-by-step through 
the stages of an antitrust lawsuit and consider what the proposed rule’s effects 
might be at each major hurdle plaintiffs must clear. 
Broadly, the proposed rule would likely lead courts to place more 
emphasis on causation and less on market definition in a certain set of cases.  
Under the current regime, plaintiffs’ lawyers have an incentive to seek cases 
where they can define a market very narrowly.  Assuming it is more 
beneficial for lawyers to investigate instances where entire competitive 
strategies are cut off than to investigate where markets can be construed 
narrowly, this effect is desirable.  In any event, the implications will 
hopefully become clearer with a step-by-step investigation. 
The first hurdle any plaintiff must clear is the motion to dismiss.  “To 
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.’”305  Following the proposed rule, if plaintiffs plead sufficient facts that, 
accepted as true, make it plausible that the agreement blocks at least one 
competitive strategy entirely, the hurdle is cleared.  Practically, it means that 
where such a showing is made, plaintiffs need not prove a relevant market or 
make a separate showing of market power to clear a motion to dismiss. 
If the case clears a motion to dismiss, the parties will proceed to discovery.  
Here is the phase where the rule does most of its work.  In today’s typical 
antitrust case, a large portion of discovery is devoted to market definition.306  
Both sides generally offer experts who prepare lengthy reports, often 
containing the most complex economic analysis found in the whole 
process.307  Each of them then responds to the other side in a rebuttal report 
and then there is a final round of replies.308  Every expert is then deposed.309  
Where the proposed rule is satisfied, courts should grant motions by plaintiffs 
to restrict or eliminate market definition discovery.  Of course, plaintiffs who 
choose that path would not be able to fall back on proving market power 
separately if their case under the proposed rule fails. 
The next landmark is the summary judgment motion.  Where the rule is 
satisfied, summary judgment on market power should be granted in favor of 
the plaintiffs.  The effect of such a ruling is that the issue of market definition 
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does not appear in any way, shape, or form before the factfinder.  It is entirely 
possible to grasp antitrust cases and the arguments made therein without 
hearing of such a thing as a relevant market and is likely a better way to 
understand the issues in many cases.  Introducing expert testimony regarding 
cross elasticity merely to define the market runs the risk that jurors will be 
immediately overwhelmed and check out.310 
The proposed rule is derived not from complex economic theory but from 
a close examination of what economic competition means at its most basic 
foundation, guided by the statements of the Sherman Act’s drafters and the 
opinions of the Supreme Court.311  Simplifying antitrust cases to this level is 
not only advantageous in reducing error and efficiency costs but necessary to 
maintain the jury’s vital check on judicial power.312  There are ripe issues 
that need to be decided by juries.313  Getting them decided is in everyone’s 
interest, but if cases remain overwhelmingly complex, the incentive will 
remain for early dismissal or quick settlements and cases will never reach 
juries.314  The proposed role is meant in part to help them get there. 
E.  Pay-for-Delay Agreements:  A Case Study 
The purpose of this section is to expand upon and clarify what the proposed 
rule might look like in practice by way of a case study of pharmaceutical pay-
for-delay lawsuits.  These cases provide a good example because there is 
often enough evidence to satisfy the rule, and some courts have begun to 
recognize that market definition is unnecessary while others continue to 
require it.315  A brief description of the unique underlying legislation at issue 
in pay-for-delay cases is provided below, followed by an exploration of what 
the results of the proposed rule might look like when applied to them. 
Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
(Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984316 with the goal of increasing the use of 
generic drugs to bring down overall drug costs.317  Among the problems the 
law addressed were the cumbersome Food and Drug Administration approval 
process318 and the excessive costs for generic firms to challenge weak patents 
covering branded drugs.319  The Act made it easier for generic manufacturers 
to get approval for drugs that are bioequivalent to existing branded drugs by 
filing an “Abbreviated New Drug Application” (ANDA), a far simpler 
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process than the standard “New Drug Application.”320  It also provided an 
incentive for these companies to challenge patents covering brand drugs:  the 
first company to file an ANDA for a new generic and include a certification 
that a patent covering the brand drug is invalid or unenforceable (the “first-
filer”) gets a six-month exclusivity period during which no other companies 
can market a generic.321  Brand manufacturers, who are loath to give up their 
lucrative monopolies on patented drugs, often employ various tactics to 
extend the life of their patent protection beyond its initial term.322  The patent 
office lacks the resources for thorough investigations, so the result is that 
many drugs are covered by patents long after the initial patent term has 
expired, but many of those patents would not hold up if challenged in 
court.323  The Hatch-Waxman Act’s drafters recognized this and provided 
this incentive to force brand manufacturers to defend their patents in court.324  
Once an ANDA is filed on a drug with nominal patent protection, the patent 
owners have forty-five days to bring an infringement suit before the generic 
can enter.325  Once the suit is filed, generic entry is postponed for an 
additional thirty months or until the patent is judged invalid or enforceable, 
whichever comes first.326 
Pay-for-delay agreements arise when brand manufacturers settle these 
patent suits with a payment to the generic manufacturer in exchange for a 
delay in the launch of the generic until the expiration of the patent or some 
other specified date.327  These agreements are sometimes called reverse 
payments because the company that brought the lawsuit pays the initial target 
to settle the case, the opposite of what normally happens in a civil 
settlement.328  The size of these payments is an indicator of both the power 
of the branded firm to maintain a supracompetitive price (market power) and 
the weakness of the patent at issue.  Where a brand drug is protected by a 
legitimate patent, no payment is needed to keep generics off the market, and 
where a branded company lacks market power, a payment to one firm would 
be useless since other market forces would bring the price to a competitive 
level.329 
Pay-for-delay agreements started to become common in the early 2000s, 
and when antitrust enforcers, drug wholesalers, consumers, and retailers 
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caught on, they began to bring antitrust lawsuits claiming the reverse 
payments were anticompetitive.330  One of these cases, Actavis, made it to 
the Supreme Court, which found in 2013 that the agreements were potentially 
anticompetitive and that the size of a reverse payment is itself a strong 
indicator of market power.331  Therefore, the larger the payment, the more 
profit the branded firm stood to lose from price competition and the more 
market power the firm necessarily has.332  Despite this decision, lower courts 
still give significant attention to market definition in many pay-for-delay 
cases.333  Defendants frequently argue that the product market for a given 
drug extends to other drugs which treat the same condition, despite strong 
evidence that neither doctors nor patients usually consider cost when 
choosing a drug, meaning price competition is very limited.334  Calling 
different drugs that treat the same condition substitutes is often inaccurate 
due to this lack of price sensitivity,335 and as the Supreme Court recognized, 
the existence of the payment itself demonstrates that the brand manufacturer 
had the power to maintain a supracompetitive price; the payment does not 
make economic sense otherwise.336 
Reverse payments are especially suspect due to the exclusivity period 
baked into the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Where a brand manufacturer pays the 
first-filer to delay its launch, the entire market is held hostage because no 
other generic can enter until the expiration of the exclusivity.337  This fact is 
key in applying the proposed rule.  Where there is evidence that a pay-for-
delay agreement blocked all generic entry for a certain amount of time, courts 
should avoid market definition discovery and should grant summary 
judgment on market power for the plaintiffs. 
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While most courts still consider market definition a separate required 
element in these cases,338 some have begun to step away from it.339  Judge 
Stefan R. Underhill in the District of Connecticut, for example, took the 
affirmative step of issuing an order to show cause to the defendants that 
requested a briefing on why he should allow discovery on market 
definition.340  Specifically, the order asked the defendants to address (1) 
whether proof of overcharges necessarily proves market power, (2) whether 
sales and pricing data regarding only the drug and its generic could prove 
directly that the price was supracompetitive, and (3) whether market 
definition was “necessary or material.”341  During oral argument, Judge 
Underhill articulated a view that market definition adds confusion to many 
antitrust cases, that avoiding it is often in the interest of judicial economy, 
and that the Sherman Act covers anticompetitive effects on any relevant 
market.342  In response to the judge’s question at oral argument, defense 
counsel argued that “[t]here’s a lot of competition going on here, we 
think. . . .  The economists need to review this material, tell us what the 
answer is.”343  Judge Underhill ruled that “the relevant market in this case is 
determined by the nature of the challenged agreement, that the only relevant 
market in this litigation is therefore the market of Aggrenox and its generic 
equivalents, and that no discovery or evidence relating to other drugs as 
potential substitutes is relevant.”344 
The alignment of the reasoning in this decision with the proposed rule is 
evidence of the rule’s potential viability and of the plausibility of courts 
experimenting with it or something like it.  There is one step Judge Underhill 
did not take (he did not need to in that case), which the rule does:  direct proof 
of supracompetitive price or decreased output should not be required; proof 
of a blocked competitive strategy should be enough.  That tweak serves to 
solidify the move away from hypothetical price numbers, cross elasticities of 
demand, and the like.  In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litigation ended up settling 
before trial, like almost all antitrust cases do.345 
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As of this writing, only three pay-for-delay cases have gone to trial, with 
two of them settling before a verdict.346  That leaves a sample of one:  a jury 
trial in the District of Massachusetts regarding Nexium, a blockbuster drug 
used to treat indigestion.347  The results of special questions to the jury in 
that case revealed a finding for the plaintiffs on the market-power element 
and a finding for defendants on causation, leading to no liability.348 
Of course, no firm conclusions can be drawn from one case, but the only 
available evidence of its kind suggests that the jury found its way through the 
weeds to the heart of the issue.  In the end, they were unconvinced that absent 
the agreement, any generic companies would have launched.349  Certain 
case-specific facts significantly increased doubt in that area, doubt which is 
not present in many other pay-for-delay cases.350  The plaintiffs simply could 
not prove that the generic more likely than not would have launched earlier 
without the agreement.351  This is exactly the analysis that would have been 
called for under the proposed rule—the only differences being that the market 
definition questions would not go to the jury and all those hours of testimony 
and pages of exhibits and expert reports would vanish. 
CONCLUSION 
The role of market definition in antitrust cases is in flux.  Both courts and 
commentators have begun to question its usefulness in achieving the goals of 
the antitrust laws.  In exploring other strategies, courts need to know where 
they can confidently dispense with market definition.  Practitioners on both 
sides of the antitrust bar, potential plaintiffs, and all those who make strategic 
business decisions stand to benefit from a rule clarifying when plaintiffs can 
make a prima facie case without defining a relevant market.  This Note has 
endeavored to design such a rule for cases falling under section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.  In many of these cases, a look at the strategies available to the 
defendant’s competitors is the best place for courts to start their inquiries.  By 
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simplifying the issues, this approach can streamline cases, improving 
efficiency, accuracy, and consistency.  It can also help get more antitrust 
cases in front of juries, strengthening that vital check on judicial power in 
cases that may alter the structure of economic relations in this country. 
